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Abstract 
Purpose of Study: An experiment was conducted to investigate whether causally related outcomes of concurrent decisions are 
more frequently integrated than unrelated outcomes, and whether certain outcomes are more frequently integrated than uncertain 
outcomes. Method: Sixteen undergraduates in one group chose between buying means-end related and unrelated pairs of 
everyday consumer products, whereas 16 undergraduates in another group chose between lottery tickets with the consumer 
products as prizes. Findings and Results: The results indicated that both causal relatedness and uncertainty of outcomes of 
concurrent decisions affect integration. Conclusions: Means and ends were more often chosen when they were presented in the 
same sets of two concurrent decisions than when they were presented together with unrelated options or singly. The observed 
differences were smaller when choices were made between uncertain outcomes. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
A decision maker sometimes makes two or more decisions at the same time (Brehmer, 1992; Huber, 
1990). Such decisions are referred to as concurrent. The decisions are completely dependent if the 
decision maker evaluates and chooses among all combinations of the outcomes of each of the options 
entailed by each decision. It is, however, more plausible in most cases that no outcomes or only a subset of 
outcomes are combined (Garling et al., 1997). Thus, concurrent decisions are frequently totally or partially 
independent. 
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     In its simplest case integration of the outcomes of two concurrent decisions refers to adding the utilities 
of the expected outcomes of one decision to the utilities of the expected outcomes of another decision. 
The principle of utility maximization then predicts integration of the outcomes of two concurrent 
decisions if the utilities of the outcomes of an option available in the first decision increase the 
utilities of the outcomes of an option available in the second decision. If such is not the case, the two 
decisions are not integrated. However, consider the following demonstration by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981, p. 454) violating the utility -maximization principle: 
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, 
then indicate the options you prefer. 
Decision (i). Choose between: 
A. a sure gain of $240 
B. 25% chance to gain $1,000, and 75% chance to gain nothing  
 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. a sure loss of $750 
D. 75% chance to lose $1,000, and 25% chance to lose nothing 
 
     A majority of participants chose options A and D. However, in choosing between the following 
two alternatives, they chose B' which maximizes expected utility: 
A'. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $760  
B'. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $750 
     As realized, alternative B´ is B and C combined whereas A´ is A and D combined. Thus, participants 
did not make the two decisions which  overall maximized expected value. 
     Why did the concurrent decisions in this demonstration not maximize expected utility? It should first 
be noted that if the decisions are independent, consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) each decision maximizes value. Because the 
value function is concave for gains and convex for losses, the value associated with  a  sure  gain of $240 
is greater than 24% of the value associated  with  a  gain of $1,000. At the same time, the value associated 
with a loss of $750 is smaller than 75% of the value associated with a loss of $1,000. In addition Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) assumed that in an editing phase each decision was framed  in  a  ”minimal  
account,”  that  is, as being independent of the other decision. Such a decision frame may frequently be 
employed because it "(i) simplifies evaluations and reduces cognitive strain, (ii) reflects the intuition that 
consequences should be causally linked to acts, and (iii) matches the properties of hedonic   experience   
which   is   more   sensitive   to   desirable and un desirable changes than to steady states" (p. 457 ). 
     For integration to occur, the outcomes of concurrent decisions may need to be causally linked (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). In a similar vein, Bonini and Rumiati (1996) showed that the likelihood that 
participants made dependent decisions in the jacket and calculator problem increased when it was made 
salient that the outcomes were related. For instance, purchase choices were dependent when they were 
embedded in a shopping list. 
     One hypothesis we investigate in the present experiment is that causally related outcomes are more 
frequently integrated. Causal relatedness is varied by comparing concurrent choices of buying fictitious 
means-end related everyday consumer products with concurrent choices of buying unrelated such 
products or single choices of buying the products. We expect that the means to the ends are more 
frequently chosen if the ends have been chosen. Conversely, the ends may be more frequently chosen if 
the means to the ends have been chosen. The rationale is that the means and ends have a higher utility 
if chosen together than if chosen in isolation. 
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Means-end relations are, however, only one possible perceived relation that may increase 
integration. For instance, Boe and Garling (1998) investigated choices between gambles with monetary 
outcomes where the existence of a common budget (cf. Bonini & Rumiati, 1996) may make the 
outcomes be perceived as related. The failure of Boe and Garling to find integration is therefore likely to 
have another reason. Uncertainty about the outcomes may be such a reason.  
     Uncertain outcomes may impose cognitive strain since the decision maker needs to enumerate all the 
combinations of outcomes and calculate their joint probabilities. A decision maker may also find it 
difficult or be unwilling to imagine different futures. Therefore, even though the number of alternatives 
to be enumerated does not increase, uncertainty or risk associated with outcomes may lead to them being 
ignored. Garling and Romanus (1997) and Tversky and Shafir (1992) found that a prior outcome did not 
influence subsequent choices until it was known with certainty. For instance, when participants in 
Garling and Romanus were told that the chance of winning a prior bet was .75 (or .25 ),  no  effect  on  a  
subsequent  bet  was  observed. In contrast, if participants knew that they had won (or lost) they 
became more risk seeking (or risk aversive). Boe and Garling (1998) directly compared a known prior 
outcome to risky outcomes entailed by con current decisions. In their Experiment 1 they observed 
integration of the prior outcomes but no integration of identical outcomes of a dominant chosen decision 
alternative when the outcomes had a probability of .50. 
     In the present experiment we also investigate the effect of uncertainty. In addition to the group of 
participants who make choices of buying different consumer products, another group of participants was 
asked to make choices of buying lottery tickets with the consumer products as prizes. Thus, the outcomes 
(the consumer products) were uncertain. Less frequent choices of the means-end related consumer 
products are then expected since the uncertainty associated with whether or not the outcome is obtained 
may prevent participants from perceiving the additional utility obtained from choosing the means-end 
related outcomes.  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
     Thirty-two undergraduates participated in the experiment in return for the equivalent of USD 7.00. 
They were recruited from a pool of undergraduates who at the beginning of the semester volunteered to 
participate in experiments. An equal number of men and women were randomly assigned to two groups 
of equal size. 
2.2. Materials 
     The materials consisted of the four sets of consumer products displayed in Table 1. Each set 
comprised five items in similar price ranges. In the different sets two items were chosen to be related to 
each other since they are means for using the other ones. The remaining three were unrelated. This was 
verified in a pre-test .  In this pre-test another group of 22 undergraduates (8 men and 14 women) 
recruited from the same pool of undergraduates participated. The participants chose between two 
consumer products which they imagined that they needed. A third item was indicated which they 
already had decided to buy. The results showed that the  means (or ends) were chosen in 75.9 % of the 
trials when the  ends (or means) were the items participants had already decided to buy, in 40.4 % of the 
trials when an unrelated product was the items they had already decided to buy. A dependent t-test 
showed that this difference was highly significant, t20 = 7.71, p<.001. 
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   Table 1. Sets of consumer products used in the experiment .  
 
Set 
 
Mean s 
 
Ends 
 
Unrelat ed Unrelat ed 
 
Unrelat ed 
 
Set 1 
 
t elephone 
 
answering machine 
 
Radio alarm clock 
 
tape recorder 
Set 2 TV VCR stereo book shelf wri t ing desk 
Set 3 washing 
machine 
tumble- drier refrigerator  
 
dish washer kitchen stove 
Set 4 slalom skis skiing boot s bicycle rowing  machine cycle exerciser 
 
2.3. Design 
     The design was mixed factorial with degree of uncertainty as a between-subjects factor. A within-
subject factor was whether the decisions were concurrent involving both means and ends, whether the 
decisions were concurrent involving only the means or the ends, or whether the decisions were made 
singly. 
2.4. Procedure 
     Participants served in groups of four or less. When arriving at the laboratory, they were seated in 
private boots in front of a computer. General instructions first presented on the screen were read by 
the participants. An experimenter was present to answer questions. Participants were then presented 
with one block with the single decisions and another block with the concurrent decisions. The order of 
the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Each participant only received decision problems 
entailing two of the sets of consumer products. Which sets participants received was counterbalanced. 
In each block the order of the decision problems was individually randomized. 
     As shown in Table 2, participants received three sets of concurrent decisions which either included 
both means and ends, only ends, or only means. The decision problems were presented simultaneously 
on the computer screen, one decision problem above the other. Across subjects and sets of consumer 
products, the order of the decisions (whether the means or the ends were an alternative in the decision 
above or below) and the left-right position on the screen were counterbalanced. Single decisions were 
presented alone on the screen. 
 
                         Table 2. Sets of concurrent decisions (M=means, E=end, U=unrelated). 
 Means and ends       Mean s Ends 
1st choicea       M or U1          M or U1         U 3  or U1 
2nd choice       E  or U2         U3  or U2           E or U2 
 
aThe denotat ions 1st and 2nd are arbitrary and do not refer to position on the computer screen or response order, which were 
counterbalanced. 
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     Participants assigned to the certainty group were asked to imagine that they made a choice of buying 
one of the consumer products in pairs. In the uncertainty group participants were asked to imagine that 
they chose to buy one of two lottery tickets which gave them a chance (probability unspecified) of 
winning the consumer products.  In all other respects the procedure was the same 
     In the block with concurrent decisions, participants were explicitly instructed to carefully attend to 
all the information presented on the computer screen while making their choices. Then they pressed 
return and responded to the decision problem above by indicating their first choice (A or B). 
Thereafter,  they rated how much they preferred the chosen alternative using a 7-point scale ranging 
from slightly more to much more preferred. After pressing return once again, they indicated their 
second choice (C or D) followed by another rating. The procedure for the single decisions was exactly the 
same as for the first choice. 
     After having completed the tasks, participants were debriefed and paid. The sessions lasted for 
approximately 30 minutes. 
3. Findings and Results 
     Table 3 shows the mean percentages of choices of the means and ends in the certainty and uncertainty 
groups. The ratings are not reported since they yielded closely similar results. As clearly indicated, participants 
chose the means and ends to a much higher degree when they were presented together than when the 
concurrent decisions entailed only means or ends and unrelated outcomes, or when single decisions of 
ends or means  were made. As may also be seen, this effect is weaker in the uncertainty group. As 
substantiated by a 2 (group: certain vs. uncertain outcome) by 3 (type of decision: concurrent decisions 
with means-end related options vs. concurrent decisions with only means or end options vs. single 
decisions) by 2  (type of option: means vs. end) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two 
factors, the  main  effect  of  type of  decision was significant,  F(1.91, 57.35) = 23.53, p<.001, MS e =.02, 
after Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the dfs. However, the interaction between group and type of 
decision did not quite reach significance, F(1.91, 57.35 ) = 2.29, p=.11, MS e =.02. Separate Bonferonni-
corrected t-tests showed at p=.05 that in both the certainty and uncertainty groups, the choices of means 
and ends were reliably more frequent than choices of the means and ends when they were unrelated or 
when they were single. The differences between choices of unrelated outcomes in the concurrent 
decisions did not differ reliably from the single choices.  For means and ends presented together the 
mean difference between the certainty and uncertainty groups were significant, whereas the differences 
for unrelated ends or means and single decisions were not significant.  
Table 3. Mean percentage choices of means and ends made of certain and uncertain outcomes when the means and ends were 
presented together or separately in concurrent decisions, or when they were presented singly. 
                                           
Certain outcomes             Uncertain outcomes 
Means and ends presented together in concurrent decisions 
Means 77.1 67.7 
Ends 82.3 61.5 
                                       Means and ends presented separately in concurrent decisions 
Means           53.1 51.0 
Ends          50.0 50.0 
Single decisions   
Means              46.9 47.9 
Ends          49.0 46.9 
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In an additional analysis of the concurrent decisions with means and ends presented together, 
individual participants were classified in three groups, those who always chose the means-end pairs,  
those who chose the means-end pairs at least 2/3 of the time, and those who chose the means-end pairs 
less than 2/3 of the time. As may be seen in Table 4, there is a clear difference in the expected direction 
showing that more participants in the certainty group than in the uncertainty group chose the means-end 
pairs. The difference was statistically significant, χ²2 = 11.50, p<.01. 
 
Table 4. Number of participants in the product and lottery groups who chose means-end pairs always, at least  2/3 of the time, 
and less than 2/3 of the time. 
                                                                                Certain outcomes                     Uncertain outcomes                                          
Always chose 
means-ends pairs                                3     1 
Chose means-ends pairs 
at least 2/3 of the time                    9     5 
Chose means-ends pairs 
less than 2/3 of the time                   4    10 
4. Conclusions 
     In line with the hypothesis, a main finding of the present experiment was that participants chose the 
means and ends more frequently when they in concurrent decisions were presented together than when 
they were presented together with unrelated outcomes or when they were presented singly. Thus, in 
contrast to Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Boe and Garling (1998), the results  indicate that outcomes 
of concurrent decisions are integrated. A necessary although not sufficient condition appeared to be that 
the outcomes were causally related so that choices of means and ends led to a higher utility than choices 
of other options. The results also supported the hypothesis that integration of uncertain outcomes of 
concurrent decisions is less likely. An unspecified probability of winning associated with the outcomes 
(consumer products) did not completely prevent integration from occurring. However, fewer 
participants with uncertain outcomes than with certain outcomes chose the means-end related pairs of 
outcomes. 
     In previous research (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992), as well as in the present 
experiment, uncertainty has been confounded with the number of outcomes. It is therefore still possible 
that the number of outcomes rather than uncertainty of the outcomes per se made integration difficult. 
However, the difference in the number of outcomes in the present experiment was minimal (two 
compared to four). Therefore, uncertainty leading to an unwillingness to think about possible futures is a 
more likely explanation. It should also be noted that the effect of uncertainty was weaker in the present 
experiment than in Boe and   Garling (1998) who observed no integration at all when the number of 
combined outcomes were larger. The number of options and outcomes was not larger. Yet, choices 
between non contextual gambles may impose more cognitive strain than choices between everyday 
consumer products. 
     Another possible account of the different results  in the present experiment and Boe and Garling 
(1998) is that the effect of uncertainty associated with the outcomes in the present experiment had another 
effect than probability associated with the outcomes had in Boe and Garling (1998). For instance, at 
least some participants in the present experiment might have been susceptible to an optimism bias 
(Zakay, 1983), thus believing that they were certain to win. If uncertainty in this way is eliminated, 
integration of the outcomes is expected. 
The present results suggest that integration of outcomes of concurrent decisions follows a utility 
maximization principle. The loss-sensitivity principle was previously proposed as an alternative (Boe 
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& Garling, 1998; Garling et al., 1997). However, although the present results may not be conclusive since 
the loss-sensitivity principle is likely to operate only when load is high, in conjunction with the results  
of Boe and Garling (1998) it is clearly indicated that uncertainty of outcomes plays a role which the loss-
sensitivity principle cannot easily accommodate. Some broader principle appears to be needed to 
account for the integration of outcomes of current decisions. 
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